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I. INTRODUCTION
We have the evidence, we see the train coming, but most
ordinary Americans, in their day-to-day lives, cannot yet hear
the whistle blowing. Unless they live in a place where they
have experienced a couple of hundred year floods in the past
decade, the consequences of global warming are not yet
readily apparent to them.'
The frightening predictions of disaster have been made, but as the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administrator observed, most
Americans have not yet suffered negative consequences of the phenomenon
known as global warming. Despite the fact that most people have not been
harmed by global warming, scientists and policy-makers around the world
have accepted evidence indicating that global warming may threaten our
health, safety, and economy in the near future. Uncertainties still exist
regarding the extent of mankind's interference with the climate and the impact
of such interference. However, evidence suggests that the costs of ignoring the
risks would be significant.
In December of 1997, representatives from over 160 nations gathered in
Kyoto, Japan, to finalize the negotiations of an international agreement to
combat global warming. This international agreement, referred to as the
Kyoto Protocol, is significant in that it is the first multilateral agreement to
establish specific emission reduction requirements for the greenhouse gases
believed to be causing global warming.' The Kyoto Protocol is also notable
because it results from the recognition of a recent development in international
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law known as the precautionary principle.3 The precautionary principle
recognizes that the role of international relationships is becoming more
important in the policies of many nations and the lives of many people.
Traditionally, international law and policy has been reactionary, but the
precautionary principle encourages the nations of the world to work out
peaceful solutions to problems before they become urgent situations or crises.
II. BACKGROUND SUMMARY
A. The Science of Global Climate Change
Global warming results from the greenhouse effect, which involves the
trapping of the sun's heat within the earth's atmosphere. While the green-
house effect is necessary to sustain life on earth, human activities have
augmented this process by causing increased atmospheric concentrations of
certain gases. The primary greenhouse gases are water vapor, carbon dioxide
(C02), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N20), and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs).
According to the EPA, atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases have
increased significantly since the Industrial Revolution, and they are expected
to reach double the pre-industrial levels by about 2060." Carbon dioxide is the
main contributor to the anthropogenic (human induced) increase in greenhouse
gases. The combustion of fossil fuels is the primary cause of increased carbon
dioxide emissions. A wide range of industrial and human activities causes
increases in the emissions of the other greenhouse gases. In recent decades,
scientists have been able to monitor the concentrations of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere. Today, scientists generally agree that the atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases are increasing due to human activities, and
3 See United Nations Environment Programme, Information Unit for Conventions,
Understanding Climate Change: A Beginner's Guide to the UN Framework Convention (visited
Sept. 24,1998) <http://www.unep.ch/iuc/submenu/begin/beginner.htm>. "The treatypromotes
action in spite of uncertainty on the basis of a recent development in international law and
diplomacy called the 'precautionary principle.' " Id.
" See United States Environmental Protection Agency, Climate Science Slides (visited Apr.
19, 2000) <http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming/presentationssciencetindex.html>, slide 3.
Since the Industrial Revolution, the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide has increased
by 30 percent; methane by 100 percent; and nitrous oxide by 15 percent. See id.
' See United States Environmental Protection Agency, Emissions Slides (visited May 2,
2000) <http://www.epa.gov/globalwarmiinglpresentationslenissions/index.html>, slide 1.
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they have warned that the increased concentrations will cause global climate
change.6
The potential results ofincreased concentrations of atmospheric greenhouse
gases remain controversial. The complex interactions between the atmo-
sphere, oceans, land, and life are not completely understood, and the capacity
of the Earth to adapt to climate change is uncertain.' One controversy
concerns the effects of water vapor on global warming. The rate of water
evaporation would increase as the Earth's surface temperature increases, but
the effect of increased water evaporation could result in an increase or
decrease in the average atmospheric temperature of the Earth.8 Further
warming would result if the water remained as vapor and acted as an
additional greenhouse gas, but if the water vapor condensed to form clouds,
sunlight would be reflected and a cooling effect could result.9 It is also
possible that ocean currents may distribute the atmosphere's heat energy in a
manner that could delay global warming.o As the atmospheric concentrations
of greenhouse gases increase, vegetation might cause positive or negative
feedbacks that could possibly increase or decrease the effects of global
warming. " Because there are many uncertainties regarding how the environ-
ment will respond to increased concentrations of greenhouse gases, many
industry leaders and policymakers believe that it is too early to take definitive
actions.
Although there is disagreement in the scientific community concerning the
rate and extent of global climate change, it is clear that the probable effects
would result in widespread economic and ecological change.1 2 If the average
global temperature increases as scientists predict,
[the] consequences will include not only more extreme
temperatures, with hotter heat and colder cold, but also more
intense rain and snowstorms, extraordinarily destructive
hurricanes, and protracted, crop-destroying droughts, particu-
larly in the interior regions of continents. Island nations and
See United States Environmental Protection Agency, Impact Slides (visited May 2, 2000)
<http://www.epa.gov/globalwarfning/presentations/impactsindex.hml>, slides 1-3.
7 See Daniel B. Botkin, Global Warming: What It Is, What Is Controversial about It, and
What We Might Do in Response to It, 9 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 119, 124 (1991).




12 See id. at 119, 130-39.
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low-lying coastal regions everywhere might disappear under
rising seas. These ecological shifts would trigger outbreaks
of infectious diseases, as they have already begun to do. 3
Increased temperatures would be particularly pronounced in mid-latitudes. 4
Agriculture, forests, grasslands, and water demand would all be affected by
drier soil conditions. The melting of polar ice caps and the thermal expansion
of water would cause a rise in sea levels, which would affect coastal resources
and human habitation along coasts. 5 In addition to these consequences,
researchers warn that the feedback effects of global warming may cause a
further increase in the rate of warming.'6 For example, increased drought
conditions could lead to wildfires burning large areas of forest. 7 This would
cause a further increase in the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases
because vegetation acts to absorb carbon dioxide, a main greenhouse gas.'8
To address the concern of global climate change, the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established by the United Nations in
1988. The task of the IPCC is to assess the impacts of climate change and
provide "comprehensive, objective, and balanced assessments"' 9 that nations
could use as a starting point for strategies to reduce their CO2 emissions.20
Composed of the leading 2,500 climate scientists and technical experts from
around the world, the IPCC studied the science and impacts of climate
change.2' The first IPCC report was issued in 1990 and concluded: "Emis-
sions resulting from human activities are substantially increasing the
atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gases.... These increases will
enhance the greenhouse effect, resulting on average in an additional warming
13 Ross GELBSPAN, THE HEAT Is ON: THE HIGH STAKES BATTLE OVER EARTH'S THREATENED
CLIMATE 11 (1997).
'4 See Botkin, supra note 7, at 131.
's See id. Botkin also notes that "[c]hanges in climate could threaten endangered species and
raise new concerns about conservation of biological diversity and about national laws and
international agreements affecting biological conservation." Id.
16 See GELBSPAN, supra note 13, at 11.
17 See id.
18 See id.
'9 United States Environmental Protection Agency, Global Warming(visited Mar. 3,2000)
<http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming/about-the-site.html> (noting that the IPCC bases its
assessment "mainly on published and peer reviewed scientific technical literature").




of the Earth's surface."22 In 1995, the IPCC issued a report concluding that the
average temperature of the Earth has increased by about one degree Fahrenheit
over the last century. The IPCC further estimated that the global surface air
temperature would increase by another 2 to 3.5 degrees Fahrenheit over the
next century.23 This would represent a faster rate of climate change than any
experienced in the last ten thousand years on this planet.24
The eleven warmest years of this century have all occurred since 1980, with
1995 being the warmest year in recorded history.25 A record heat wave during
the summer of 1995 resulted in 465 deaths in Chicago.26 If warming trends
continue as researchers expect, Americans will experience increased health
problems and heat-related deaths.27 Although winter mortality rates may
decrease, the decline is not expected to offset the increase in summer
mortality.2" The areas most vulnerable to climate change include arid and
semi-arid regions where water quantity and quality is already a problem. In
the Middle East and Africa, water scarcity may lead to further tension and
political instability.29 Although some regions may benefit economically from
a favorable climate change, many regions would be adversely affected by the
deterioration of natural ecosystems and the loss of human habitat due to rising
sea levels.
While some have suggested that recent warming trends are only normal
climate variations, research indicates that the warming of the Earth over the
last thirty years goes far beyond natural variations.3 In fact, researchers have
calculated a one-in-forty chance that the recent trends represent a natural
2 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC First Assessment Report: Overview
31 August 1990, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 280, 281 (Robin
Churchill & David Freestone eds., 1991).
'3 See 143 CONG. REC. S 10871, S 10873 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
2 See id. at S 10872-73.
' See id.
26 See id. at S 10873.
27 See id. ("[I]ncreased warming will exacerbate existing air quality problems such as smog
that aggravate asthma and allergic disorders, especially in children and the elderly. Warmer
climates breed diseases such as malaria, dengue and yellow fever, encephalitis, and cholera due
to the expansive range of mosquitoes as a consequence of increased warmer climates and other
disease-carrying organisms.").
2 See United States Environmental Protection Agency, Impact Slides, supra note 6, slide
3.
29 See 143 CONG. REC. S10871, supra note 23, at S10873.
30 See id. at S10872.
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variation.3' Based on these odds, many policymakers and scientists have
accepted global warming as a serious and significant threat.32
While a small group of dissenting scientists has been vocal in questioning
the climate change theories, the IPCC assessments are "the most widely
accepted statements ever on climate change."33 The results of continued
greenhouse gas emissions will be compounded, however, as the balancing
effects of carbon sinks are removed. Carbon sinks include forests and other
natural ecosystems that absorb greenhouse gases from the atmosphere.'
Current data show the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is 30
percent above pre-industrial levels. Existing data also show increased
concentrations of the other greenhouse gases over recent decades. 35 This
excess is accumulated in the atmosphere and causes the increased greenhouse
effect.
Although the consequences of the increased atmospheric concentrations of
greenhouse gases are not certain, it is certain that the effects will continue long
after any corrective action is undertaken. Scientists warn that the oceans will
continue to rise for several centuries even after temperatures stabilize.36 Based
on the acceptance of the [PCC reports and the present state of science, the time
to take corrective action is now. In the United States, coastal areas have
already faced problems with flooding and the erosion of beaches due to rises
in sea level. Although the fossil fuel industry has waged a massive campaign
to dispute the prospect of climate change, some oil companies have recently
decided to recognize the potential for global climate change. In comparing the
oil industry to the tobacco industry, which spent years denying the dangerous
effects of cigarettes, a Shell executive explained that his company did not want
to become trapped in lies.37 Some industries have actively supported efforts
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The insurance industry is threatened by
climate change, and many believe insurers have already paid significant costs
for increased storm damage from climate change.38 Industry figures show that
annual weather-related disaster claims rose from a total of five billion dollars
during the 1980s to thirty billion dollars during the first half of the 1990s. 39
1 See id.
32 See id.
33 GELBSPAN, supra note 13, at 69 (quoting Jerry Mahlman).
' See United Nations Environment Programme, supra note 3.
31 See Botkin, supra note 7, at 123.
36 See id. at 134-35.
37 See GELBSPAN, supra note 13, at 86.




B. International Policies and Events Preceding the Kyoto Conference
"When I was young, my father told me the countries of the world would
make peace only when they were threatened by invaders from outer space.
Today it is climate change that poses a common threat to all of humanity."'
Recognizing this common threat to humanity, the first step toward an
international legal instrument that would coordinate a global response to
climate change was taken in Rio de Janeiro during the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development in June 1992. The parties to
this conference adopted the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (FCCC), which entered into force in 1994 upon ratification by fifty
countries including the United States.4 ' The parties to the convention
acknowledged scientific evidence of a serious risk of rapid climate change
over the coming decades and centuries. Although the consequences of such
risks are uncertain, the parties chose to proceed with the precautionary
principle rather than ignore the risks."2 The convention responded by
establishing a framework calling for specific actions to be taken at a future
date.
The ultimate objective of the FCCC is to stabilize atmospheric concentra-
tions of greenhouse gases at a level that will prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system.43 In achieving this objective, the FCCC
supports a sustainable development concept, the sharing of environmentally
sound technology, and efforts to educate the citizens of the world about
climate change."
The FCCC does not specify a precise level of greenhouse gas reductions
necessary to achieve its objective. Instead, it calls only for a reduction to a
non-dangerous level that "should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient
to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food
production is not threatened and to enable economic development in a
sustainable manner."' The FCCC did take preliminary steps to encourage
40 Id. at 32.
41 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature June
4, 1992, S. TREATY DOC NO. 102-38 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992) (entered into force Mar. 21,
1994) [hereinafter FCCC]. As of July 20, 1998, the FCCC had been ratified by 175 nations.
Nations that have adopted the FCCC are legally bound by the agreement and are referred to as
"parties to the convention." Id.
42 See United Nations Environment Programme, supra note 3.
43 FCCC, supra note 41, art. 2.
" See United Nations Environment Programme, supra note 3.
45 Id.
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specific action by parties to the convention. For instance, the parties agreed
to take climate change into account in matters involving agriculture, energy
consumption, and natural resources.4 The parties were also encouraged to
share technology and cooperate in any way possible to reduce anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions. To aid in the development of international policy,
each party to the convention is required to develop a national inventory of
greenhouse gas sources and sinks.
In adopting the FCCC, the nations of the world recognized that the threat
of global warming was an international problem requiring an international
solution. The parties to the convention understood that reducing greenhouse
gas emissions would involve significant efforts from their leaders, their
industries, and their people. Although the parties to the convention agreed that
an international effort was necessary, there continues to be much disagreement
over how the responsibility for these efforts should be allocated among the
countries of the world.
Global climate change threatens the entire world, not just those people or
nations primarily responsible for the increased atmospheric concentrations of
greenhouse gases. This "fundamental unfairness to the climate change
problem" has intensified already strained relationships between the rich and
poor countries of the world.48 It is argued that the rich countries of the world,
while building their industries and raising their standards of living, have
caused the rise in greenhouse gases. The developing nations of the world fear
that they will not have the opportunity to become great industrial nations if
they are held responsible for significantly reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
Although developed nations may be able to maintain their present industries
and consumption rates through the use of fossil fuel alternatives, many
developing countries lack the technology and the capital to invest in new
technologies.
In response to the concerns of the world's developing nations, the FCCC
allocates the primary share of responsibility and cost for emissions reductions
to the rich nations of the world. Noting that most historical and current
emissions originate in developed countries, the FCCC calls on these nations
to "take the lead in combating climate change and its adverse impacts."' 9 The
4" See id.
4 See id. "These inventories will have to be updated regularly and made public. The
information they provide on which activities emit how much of each gas will be essential for






treaty commits the twenty-four nations of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD)50 to provide financial support to
developing countries for climate change activities." The OECD countries and
twelve "economies in transition" also agreed to specific commitments on
efforts for limiting greenhouse gas emissions and enhancing natural sinks.52
To protect the ability of less developed nations to expand industry and
improve economic and social conditions, the FCCC recognizes the right of
these nations to develop their economies. In acknowledging this right, the
FCCC notes that the greenhouse gas emissions of developing nations would
probably increase as a result of economic expansion.53 In an attempt to
address the concerns of rich and poor nations, the FCCC supports a sustainable
development concept. The goal behind this concept is to allow countries to
develop economically and seek a higher quality of life for their citizens while
at the same time ensuring that the world's natural resources are not depleted
faster than they are replaced. Given the high rate of consumption in industrial-
ized nations and the large populations of many developing nations, sustainable
development represents a significant international challenge.
The FCCC encourages the development of environmentally sound
technologies in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and promote
sustainable development. The development and adoption of clean energy
sources will reduce the consumption of coal and oil. It is hoped that new
technology will allow nations to prevent some of the effects of climate change
and adapt to those effects that may be unavoidable. For example,
"[t]echnology can make industrial processes more efficient, water purification
more viable, and agriculture more productive for the same amount of resources
invested." 4 By encouraging education about climate change and the sharing
of technology, the FCCC has established an international approach to solving
the problem of global climate change.
In following the precautionary principle, the FCCC has established a
process for future meetings and agreements while recognizing some uncer-
50 Mexico joined the OECD in 1994 and was not a party to these commitments.
5' See United Nations Environment Programme, supra note 3. This financial support
commitment is in addition to any financial assistance being given before this agreement was
made. See id.
52 See id. The economies in transition include those of Central and Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union. These commitments may not have been actually specified; however, "it
is generally accepted that the OECD and transition countries should at a minimum seek to return
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tainty and disagreement over climate change. Through the established
framework, parties may weaken or strengthen the treaty in response to new
scientific developments. The FCCC establishes the Conference of the Parties
(COP) as the supreme body of the convention. The objective of the COP is to
review the implementation of the FCCC and any related legal documents that
the COP may adopt." The COP is to meet periodically to assess the imple-
mentation of the FCCC and to facilitate cooperative actions for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions.
5 6
The COP met twice prior to its December 1997 conference in Kyoto, Japan.
The first Conference of the Parties (COP-i) was held in Berlin in April 1995.
At COP- 1, the parties decided that the existing commitments were inadequate
to meet the objectives of the FCCC for three reasons: first, most Annex I
parties were not on track to meet the emissions aims of the FCCC for the year
2000; second, the FCCC contained no provision for emissions reductions after
2000; and third, the parties recognized that the stabilization of greenhouse gas
emissions at 1990 levels would not be sufficient to stabilize atmospheric
greenhouse gas concentrations." In response to these inadequacies, the parties
issued the Berlin Mandate. The purpose of the Berlin Mandate was to initiate
a process to strengthen the FCCC's commitments through a legally binding
instrument.5"
The Berlin Mandate set a goal for the parties to negotiate quantified
emissions limitation and reduction objectives for the post-2000 time frame.59
The Ad-Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate was established to begin negotia-
tion of the new legal instrument. 6° In setting the stage for the negotiation of
a binding document, the parties agreed not to introduce new commitments for
developing countries.6' The Berlin Mandate does specify, however, that
developing countries should advance the implementation of their existing
commitments under the FCCC.62
55 See FCCC, supra note 41, art. 7, § 2.
56 See id. art. 7, § 4.
17 See Clare Breidenich et al., Current Development, The Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 315, 318 (1998).
ss See id.
9 See id. These objectives are also referred to as QELROs or emissions targets. See id.
o The parties hoped to adopt a binding document at the third Conference of the Parties
(COP-3) in 1997. The Ad-Hoc group met eight times from 1995 to 1997 to develop the
framework and specific provisions of the new instrument. The group produced a draft to serve
as the negotiating document at Kyoto (COP-3). See id.
61 See Walter V. Reid & Jos6 Goldemberg, Developing Countries Are Combating Climate




The Conference of the Parties met in Geneva for its second meeting in
April 1996. In the Geneva Declaration, the parties "agreed on guidelines for
submission of the first national communications by developing countries." 3
The Geneva Declaration endorsed the Second Assessment Report of the IPCC
as" 'the most comprehensive and authoritative assessment of the science of
climate change.' ""
C. The Kyoto Protocol
Some have heralded the [Kyoto] Protocol as one of the most
significant advances in environmental regulation, but many
do not hold it in such high regard. Some claim the effort to be
too little, too late, and others fear the Protocol threatens the
U.S. economy and is unfair to developed nations. Whatever
the deficiencies, the fact that an agreement could even be
reached indicates that most nations are sufficiently convinced
of the threat of global warming to want to take action.65
The Kyoto Protocol was adopted by over 160 countries at the third Conference
of the Parties to the FCCC. It was described in the press as a sweeping
environmental treaty because it established the first legally binding limits for
the emissions of greenhouse gases by industrialized countries.'
The protocol was opened for signature on March 16,1998, and it remained
open until March 15, 1999.67 Countries may accede to the protocol after the
expiration of this period.68 The protocol will enter into force ninety days after
the date on which not less than fifty-five parties to the convention have
adopted the protocol. In addition to the fifty-five party requirement, the
protocol must be accepted by enough Annex I parties to represent at least 55
63 Charlotte Booncharoen & John Gase, Note, International Commitment Toward Curbing
Global Warming: The Kyoto Protocol, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 917, 922 (1998).
4 Id.
65 Id. at 917-18.
"See Lori Tripoli, Greenhouse Gas: Who's Happy About Kyoto?, ENVTL. COMPLIANCE &
LrNG. STRATEGY, Jan. 1998, at 1, 1.
67 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec.
10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (opened for signature Mar. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. A
copy of the protocol may be downloaded from the FCCC web site, <http://www.unfccc.de>.
"See id. art. 24, § 1.
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percent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of all the parties
included in Annex 1.69
The Kyoto Protocol contains substantive commitments addressing the three
primary concerns of the parties at COP-i: it sets binding emission reduction
targets for industrialized nations, ° it requires industrialized parties to
implement or elaborate appropriate policies to meet these reduction targets,7
and it seeks to advance the existing commitments that pertain to all parties to
the FCCC, including developing nations.72
The Kyoto Protocol encourages parties to promote sustainable development
in implementing their reduction commitments.7 a In order to promote
sustainable development, article two of the protocol calls for the parties to
implement policies that will enhance energy efficiency, protect reservoirs and
sinks of greenhouse gases, promote sustainable forms of agriculture in light of
climate change considerations, promote the research, development, and use of
new and renewable forms of energy, and reduce or phase-out market
imperfections that run counter to the objectives of the FCCC.74 In addition,
"parties must attempt to minimize adverse social, environmental, and
economic impacts on the developing countries.,
75
Land use and forestry practices play an important role in the sequestration
and removal of atmospheric greenhouse gases. The FCCC encouraged
countries to take advantage of sinks in order to mitigate climate change, but
there was no specification regarding how countries were to include the
removal of greenhouse gases by sinks when calculating their overall emis-
sions.76 As a result, different parties used various methods to account for and
credit removal by sinks, and some parties did not provide any data on
greenhouse gas sequestration.77 Another issue resulting from the FCCC's
vagueness was the method used to calculate emissions sequestration:
[M]ost countries calculate emissions from LUCF [Land Use
Change and Forestry] as an annual flow rate of carbon
6 See id. art. 25, § 1.
70 See id. art. 3, § 7.
7, See id. art. 2.
7 See id. art. 10.
71 See id.
74 See id. art. 2.
7' Booncharoen & Gase, supra note 63, at 924.
76 See Breidenich et al., supra note 57, at 322 (referring to FCCC art. 4(2)(a) and (b)).
77 See id. Some countries combined their removal by sink figures with other categories of
emissions to yield a net total, and others reported the information separately. Id.
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sequestered or emitted. Since the ability of trees to sequester
carbon declines over time, a country with a large proportion
of forested area, hence a high rate of carbon sequestration in
the base year, will not be able to maintain the same rate of
carbon sequestration in the later years as its forestry resources
age. The declining rate of carbon sequestration in these
countries makes an emissions target more difficult to attain.
Conversely, countries that had net emissions from LUCF in
their base year, due to deforestation, can ease the difficulty in
attaining their target simply by decreasing the rate of defores-
tation. Thus, the system under the FCCC rewarded countries
that historically had been deforesters and penalized countries
that historically had been afforesters.7"
During the Kyoto negotiations, the issue of sequestration by sinks was
debated intensely. The parties disagreed on how the sinks should be accounted
for and the provisions of the FCCC did not provide sufficient guidance on that
matter. After extensive negotiations, the parties to the Kyoto Protocol
included a compromise agreement that creates an accounting system to reward
increased forestry sinks and to penalize deforestation.79 Article three of the
protocol allows parties to use their emissions sequestrations by sinks as a
factor during the commitment period, but if a party's land use and forestry
activities resulted in net greenhouse gas emissions in 1990, these emissions
will not be included in calculating its base year emissions.80 Article three also
requires Annex I countries to report to the COP the totals of their greenhouse
gas emissions and removals by sinks for all anthropogenic activities since
1990.1 There are still some details requiring clarification before countries can
determine how to use sinks towards their reduction targets.
Flexibility is one of the defining features of the Kyoto Protocol. Flexibility
has been viewed as an essential element of a successful agreement because of
the long-term nature of the climate change problem and the uncertainties
78 Id.
79 See id.
80 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 67, art. 3, §§ 3, 7. "Recognizing the difficulty that this new
accounting system will create for a few parties, the Protocol requires Annex I countries with net
emissions from LUCF in 1990 (i.e., those Annex I countries which were deforesting in 1990)
to include those emissions in their base year, which has the effect of correspondingly raising
their assigned amount and allowed emissions." Breidenich et al., supra note 57, at 322.
" See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 67, art. 3, § 3.
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related to climate change. 2 This feature will make the agreement more
attractive to many parties. The protocol does not impose quantified limitations
on the developing nations, but it does install legally binding emissions targets
for Annex I countries within a flexible timetable. These targets are to be met
by the commitment period of 2008 to 2012, and the Annex I parties are to
show demonstrable progress in achieving the protocol's commitments by
2005."3 The multi-year commitment period gives parties flexibility in
achieving their targets and takes into account "annual fluctuations, for
example, from business cycles.""
In establishing goals for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, the
protocol considers emissions and the sequestrations of greenhouse gases by
carbon sinks.85 The protocol calls for reductions of aggregate carbon dioxide-
equivalent emissions of greenhouse gases by at least 5 percent below baseline
levels. The protocol uses 1990 as the baseline year for determining the
permitted emissions levels of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide for
each industrial country. Each country may choose either its 1990 or 1995
emissions level to calculate the baseline for the other three greenhouse gases.8
There is no uniform reduction target for all Annex I parties. The protocol
defines a percentage of the base year emissions for each party, and the parties
are to reduce their emissions to the set percentage of the base year before the
expiration of the commitment period. The percentages range from an 8
percent reduction for several countries (which is 92 percent of the base year)
82 See Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change:
A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 451, 555-56 (1993). In evaluating the FCCC, Bodansky
noted several criteria in addition to flexibility that were necessary for a successful convention.
These criteria were: political acceptability to a wide variety of states, equity (to encourage
burden-sharing while treating developing countries fairly), economic efficiency by allowing
states to consider cost-effective measures to address climate change, a framework for future
action, and established targets and timetables for greenhouse gas limitations. These criteria can
also be used to assess the Kyoto Protocol. Id. at 555.
83 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 67, art. 3, §§ 1-2. Article three, section one reads: "I.
The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their aggregate
anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A
do not exceed their assigned amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation
and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the provisions of this
Article, with a view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 percent below
1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012." Id. art. 3, § 1.
" Breidenich et al., supra note 57, at 321.
See id. at 319.
'4See Booncharoen & Gase, supra note 63, at 925.
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to a 10 percent increase for Iceland. 7 To determine if the commitments are
achieved, each country's total emissions for the commitment period will be
averaged.
In addition to a flexible timeframe, the protocol allows for flexibility in the
parties' national implementation programs. Parties may meet their reduction
targets through the gain or transfer of emission reduction units (ERUs) and
credits from projects complying with the other requirements of the protocol. 8
These mechanisms may be used within a nation or cooperatively among
nations. Article four of the Kyoto Protocol allows parties to adopt joint
implementation programs.8 9 Joint implementation would allow countries to
implement their emissions limitations jointly and perhaps more effectively.
Greenhouse gases migrate globally and remain in the atmosphere for long
periods of time after they are released. To reduce the greenhouse effect, it is
necessary to reduce the total global emissions of greenhouse gases, but it
makes little difference where emissions are reduced. This feature of
greenhouse gas emissions suggests that a comprehensive regional approach
may be more effective than a country-by-country regulatory approach.9" Cost
effectiveness is the main rationale forjoint implementation programs, but such
programs would also encourage the transfer of financial resources and
technology. 9'
The FCCC also endorses the concept ofjoint implementation.92 At COP-1,
the Parties to the Convention established a pilot phase for "Activities
Implemented Jointly." This program allows Annex I countries to invest in
greenhouse gas reduction projects in other countries. The pilot program does
not allow the investing country to apply the reduction credits against its own
8 See Breidenich et al., supra note 57, at 320. The protocol contains emissions targets for
all of the FCCC Annex I countries except Turkey. Annex B to the protocol contains the
emissions reduction targets for Annex I parties. See Appendix B, infra, for the information
contained in Annex B.
a See Booncharoen & Gase, supra note 63, at 925.
89 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 67, art. 4.
90 See Bodansky, supra note 82, at 520. "Because of differing national circumstances, the
costs of abatement measures can vary substantially by country. If greenhouse gas emissions can
be reduced more cheaply in country A than in country B, then allowing B to take advantage of
this cost differential by funding an emissions reduction in A is more efficient than requiring B
to achieve the same reduction at home." Id.
9' See id. at 482, 520.
9' FCCC, supra note 41, art. 4. Article 3, § 3 says, "Efforts to address climate change may
be carried out cooperatively by interested parties." Id. art. 3, § 3. Article 4, § 2(a) says, 'These
Parties may implement such policies and measures jointly with other Parties and may assist other
Parties in contributing to the achievement of the objective of the Convention .. " Id. art. 4, §
2(a).
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national commitments. There was speculation that if a joint implementation
program was adopted beyond the pilot phase, emission credits would be
allowed, and the credits would be shared by the investing and recipient
countries. This would allow developing countries to retain some credit for
these projects and could result in a net carbon savings.93
The technicalities of joint implementation were further debated at the
Kyoto conference. The United States and some of the other Annex I countries
wanted the pilot phase ended. They therefore proposed adopting a joint
implementation program that would allow Annex I countries to receive credits
for projects with developing nations.94 The developing countries opposed this
proposal, and the European Community, while supporting ajoint implementa-
tion program with credits among Annex I nations, agreed that a further
decision regarding developing nations should be postponed until the comple-
tion of the pilot program.95 Annex I countries also debated the mechanics of
emission trading among themselves, and the rules of emissions trading remain
to be defined.
After extensive negotiations, the provisions of the protocol defined three
mechanisms reflecting the competing proposals on international emissions
trading.96 First, joint implementation is permitted among Annex I countries.
The Kyoto Protocol does not provide specific criteria forjoint implementation
programs, but it does allow Annex I countries and private-sector participants
to earn credits for emission reduction projects in other Annex I countries. 97
This allows a country that finances an emissions reduction project in a
different country to apply the credit ("Emission Reduction Unit" or "ERU")
to offset its own reduction commitments.9"
"3 See Reid & Goldemberg, supra note 61, at 236.
9 See Breidenich et al., supra note 57, at 323.
95 See id.
96 See id. at 324.
7 See Booncharoen & Gase, supra note 63, at 926. To receivejoint implementation credits,
article six of the protocol requires a project to meet the following criteria: (1) the project must
have the approval of the parties involved; (2) the project must provide "a reduction in emissions
by sources, or an enhancement of removals by sinks, that is additional to that which would
otherwise occur"; (3) the party must comply with its obligations under articles five and seven;
and (4) "the acquisition of emission reduction units shall be supplemental to domestic actions
for the purposes of meeting commitments under article three." Kyoto Protocol, supra note 67,
art. 6.
98 See Booncharoen & Gase, supra note 63, at 926. The ERU credit may be applied to offset
a country's own reduction commitments as long as the requirements of article six are met and
the country is otherwise in compliance with the protocol. See id.
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The second mechanism of emissions trading outlines a target-based
emissions trading program. The Parties to the Convention could not agree on
the specifics of this program, but the protocol states that Annex I parties may
purchase emissions permits from other countries that have surplus credits. In
meeting the emission reduction requirements of the protocol, Annex I parties
may work jointly to achieve their commitments by aggregate emissions
reductions."
The Clean Development Mechanism is the third tool for achieving
international emissions reductions. Established in article twelve, the purpose
of the Clean Development Mechanism is "to assist Parties not included in
Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the
ultimate objective of the Convention, and to assist Parties included in Annex
I in achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation and
reduction commitments under Article 3."' Through this program, developed
nations may receive credit toward their commitments by investing in emission
reduction programs in developing nations. The requirements of this program
are more strict than those of the emissions trading program among Annex I
countries, and the developing country is only entitled to a portion of the
reduction credits earned. To meet the requirements, the participation of each
party must be voluntary and must be approved by the COP. In addition, the
project must result in "real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the
mitigation of climate change; and reductions in emissions that are additional
to any that would occur in the absence of the certified project activity. 10'
Beginning in 2000, emissions reductions obtained through the Clean
Development Mechanism may be applied towards achieving compliance in the
first commitment period. In order to further the goals of the FCCC, the
protocol requires the COP to ensure that a share of the proceeds from Clean
Development Mechanism activities is used to assist developing country parties
that are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change.
Developing nations strongly opposed being included in the protocol's
legally binding emissions reduction requirements, and their involvement in
international emissions reductions programs is limited to voluntary participa-
tion.0 2 Although developing nations are still bound by the terms of the FCCC,
they are under no substantive obligations. The Kyoto Protocol may be
" See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 67, art. 4.
'00 Id. art. 12, § 2.
101 Id. art. 12, § 5(b), (c).
102 See id. arts. 3,4,10, & 11 (placing obligations on developed countries in articles three and
four, but merely inviting developing countries to become involved in articles 10 and 11).
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amended by a three-fourths vote of the COP to include developing nations.03
The Kyoto Protocol has been criticized for lacking a compliance mecha-
nism, but this criticism is misdirected. In international law, one of the
common techniques for encouraging compliance with a bilateral or multilateral
agreement is the termination by the nonbreaching party of related obligations
under the same agreement." Incorporating this type of compliance mecha-
nism into the Kyoto Protocol would not be desirable because "if a
nonbreaching party stops performing a related obligation as a reciprocal
countermeasure, the problem the agreement seeks to remedy-in this case,
climate change-may well be exacerbated even further than it was by the
initial breach, and other nonbreaching parties would be injured as a result."' 105
Rather than using general international customs to encourage compliance with
the protocol, the parties agreed to a compliance mechanism incorporated into
the document itself. 6
The Kyoto Protocol expands on compliance mechanisms contained within
the FCCC in several ways. These improvements include:
. 1. Legally Binding Commitments. The commitments under the FCCC
were voluntary, and thus easier for parties to avoid or ignore. There were no
consequences for failing to achieve the FCCC's commitments, and most
parties made little or no progress under the FCCC. The Kyoto Protocol,
however, contains mandatory, legally binding emissions targets. Because the
targets are clearly defined, there is an objective standard for determining
whether the targets have been met, and excess emissions will result in
noncompliance with the protocol.'0 7
2. Flexible Implementation. This feature of the protocol encourages
compliance by allowing parties several options for achieving compliance.'08
3. Measurement of Emissions. The protocol clarifies the emissions
measurement guidelines of the FCCC and requires each party to have a
national system for estimating greenhouse gas emissions and removals in place
at least one year prior to the first commitment period. Parties are encouraged
to adopt the standardized methods of the IPCC for the preparation of national
greenhouse gas inventories. Parties have an incentive to use the IPCC
'03 Id. art. 19, § 3.
o' See Breidenich et al., supra note 57, at 326. Breidenich notes that this mechanism of
enforcement is probably not available for multinational agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol
due to provisions contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Id.
105 Id.
o See id. at 326-27.




standards to avoid having their estimates adjusted for uncertainty. These
standardized measurements will simplify international comparisons and make
it easier to verify the attainment of emissions targets."°
4. Reporting. The protocol expands on the FCCC's two reporting
requirements of annual inventories of greenhouse gas emissions and periodic
national communications regarding implementation. Article seven of the
protocol requires additional annual reporting to evaluate progress and ensure
compliance with the article three reduction targets.11°
5. Review of Implementation. Article eight of the protocol provides for
teams of experts to review the emissions information submitted by each party.
The review process provides a "thorough and comprehensive technical
assessment of all aspects of the implementation by a Party of this Protocol.'
The expert teams report to the COP on the status of implementation and on any
potential problems that they have identified. The COP is authorized to address
any potential compliance problems and to make appropriate decisions in
response to any problems."'
6. Consequences of Noncompliance. Article seventeen of the protocol
requires the parties to develop procedures to address noncompliance." 3 The
language of article seventeen was adopted as a compromise between parties
that wanted binding but unspecified consequences for noncompliance and
those parties that did not want to commit to unspecified consequences. ' 4
Breidenich notes, "Essentially, the parties agreed to defer consideration of
specific, binding consequences to a later date, but also agreed that they would
adopt a list of indicative measures that could be implemented sooner, although
they would not be legally binding."'" 5
Critics of the protocol's compliance mechanisms are correct in arguing that
the protocol lacks the specific details necessary to ensure compliance.
However, the protocol does establish a solid framework for discouraging
'09 See id. at 328.
110 See id.
"' Kyoto Protocol, supra note 67, art. 8, § 3.
112 See Breidenich et al., supra note 57, at 328-29.
"' See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 67, art. 17 ("The Conference of the Parties serving as the
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session, approve appropriate and effective
procedures and mechanisms to determine and to address cases of non-compliance with the
provisions of this Protocol, including through the development of an indicative list of
consequences, taking into account the cause, type, degree and frequency of noncompliance. Any
procedures and mechanisms under this Article entailing binding consequences shall be adopted
by means of an amendment to this Protocol.").
114 See Breidenich et al., supra note 57, at 329-30.
"' Id. at 330.
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noncompliance, and the lack of specific consequences for noncompliance
should not prevent parties from accepting the protocol.
D. Current Status of the Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol was adopted by delegates of more than 150 nations.
It has been signed by more than the required fifty-five parties but has not yet
met the additional requirement of the Annex I parties. Nearly 35 percent of
the world's 1990 greenhouse gas emissions came from the United States, and
another 15 percent were from Russia. 1 6 To meet the ratification requirements,
it is widely held that the Kyoto Protocol must be signed and ratified by at least
one of these two Annex I parties."7
Many provisions of the protocol were to be detailed at later sessions of the
COP. Negotiations on these provisions have continued since the parties met
at Kyoto, and these negotiations may lead to a more complete product that is
also more acceptable to many parties. For example, many countries are eager
to work out the details on emissions trading and joint implementation.
Committing to the protocol now does not mean that these details cannot be
clarified at a later date, but many countries are hesitant to adopt the protocol
before they are certain about the rules' of implementation and other key
provisions.
HI. ANALYSIS
A. United States Policies on Global Warming
In 1994, the United States emitted about 1.65 billion tons of greenhouse
gases. "8 This figure represents about 20 percent of total global greenhouse gas
emissions. To decrease this figure, the United States adopted several domestic
and international programs. The Climate Change Technology Initiative is one
of several programs designed to reduce domestic greenhouse gas emissions." 9
Led by the Department of Energy and the EPA, the initiative provides $2.7
billion to these and other agencies for research and development on energy
efficiency, renewable energy, and carbon-reduction technologies. To
encourage the adoption of more efficient technologies in buildings, industrial
U6 See Booncharoen & Gase, supra note 63, at 929.
17 See id.
11 See Environmental Protection Agency, Emissions Slides, supra note 5, slide 1.
"9 See 144 CONG. REC. 59524 (daily ed. July 31, 1998) (statement of Sen. Enzi).
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processes, power generation, and vehicles, the initiative also includes $3.6
billion in tax incentives.120
The Global Change Research Program, led by NASA and the National
Science Foundation, was established to increase knowledge of climate change
and variability, atmospheric chemistry, and ecosystems.' 2 ' The program will
develop better climate change monitoring systems to help assess the possible
impacts of climate change on the United States. The results of the program's
scientific assessments will be used for policymaking. Other federal agencies
conduct programs indirectly related to climate change. These programs
include research efforts to reduce fuel consumption and to improve energy
efficiency and vehicular traffic flows.1
2 1
The United States also contributes to international efforts to combat climate
change. In June 1997, President Clinton announced a one billion dollar, five-
year commitment to address climate change in developing nations."2 The
money from the initiative will be used for programs promoting energy
efficiency, forestry, agriculture, and otherprojects. In October 1997, President
Clinton outlined an expanded domestic program designed to reduce green-
house gas emissions. The program was to take effect regardless of the
outcome of negotiations in Kyoto, and it included (1) a plan for activities that
encourage good energy and environmental policy and (2) a mandatory
domestic emissions trading system to take effect in the 2008-2012 period if an
agreement were reached in Kyoto and adopted by the United States govern-
ment.24
The president's expanded domestic program includes an electricity
restructuring proposal estimated to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the
United States by roughly twenty-five to forty million metric tons per year.
25
In addition, the administration is working with industry leaders to promote
voluntary agreements that would produce further emissions reductions. The





24 See The Kyoto Protocol and the President's Policies to Address Climate Change:
Administration Economic Analysis, July 1998, at ii (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <www.epa.gov/
oppeoeel/globalwarming/publications/actions/wh.kyoto/index.html> [hereinafter Administra-
tion Economic Analysis].
'2 See id. at v ("Competition would provide a direct profit incentive for generators to
produce more electricity with less fuel and improve energy efficiency. Several specific
provisions in the Administration's proposal would yield further emissions reductions.").
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agreement that established goals for voluntary improvements in home energy
use. Announced in May 1998, the PATH program would reduce emissions in
2010 by about twenty-four million metric tons. 26 Finally, the administration
is seeking to reduce emissions by the federal government, the nation's largest
consumer of energy.'27
B. United States Opposition to the Kyoto Protocol
The United States was successful in achieving several goals during the
negotiations at Kyoto. First, the protocol includes a multi-year commitment
period to begin in 2008. This multi-year period is important to the United
States objective of flexibility in achieving emissions reductions. The position
of negotiators from many nations was that a multi-year target was too weak
and that an earlier target was necessary to make the agreement more effective
in its goal of reducing global emissions. The United States, however, was able
to successfully negotiate from the position that an earlier target would
seriously weaken the United States economy and would call for drastic
measures that would not permit flexibility in implementation.
Second, the protocol includes emissions trading and joint implementation
provisions advocated by the United States. 2 The Clinton Administration
supports these mechanisms as a means of reducing the costs to United States
citizens of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. Despite these successes from
the United States' perspective, there is much opposition to the protocol
between industry leaders and the United States Congress. The basic issues
behind this opposition are a perceived lack of meaningful participation by the
developing nations and the uncertain costs of the protocol to the United States
economy.
Prior to the meeting of the parties at Kyoto, the United States Senate passed
a "sense of the Senate" resolution to send a message to the Clinton Adminis-
tration and the United States delegates to the conference.2 This message
contained a strong sentiment against the United States adoption of any
international agreement that placed primary responsibility for the reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions on developed nations. The message, known as the
Byrd-Hagel resolution, was adopted by the Senate in July 1997, and it
12 See id.
127 See id.
'2s See Sungwhee Shin, Viewpoint: Developing Country'sPerspective on COP3 Development
(Kyoto Protocol), 26 ENERGY POL'Y 519, 520 (1998).
'9 In order for a treaty to legally bind the United States, it must be signed by the president
and ratified by two-thirds of the Senate. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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encouraged the president not to sign any treaty unless the following require-
ments were met: first, the treaty must legally bind developing nations to meet
reduction targets within the same compliance period as the developed nations
and second, the treaty must not result in serious harm to the United States
economy. 1
30
This resolution was adopted by the Senate because of concern regarding the
negotiations leading to the Kyoto Conference. Many believed that the best
interests of the United States were not being reflected in the negotiations, and
the Senate wanted to ensure that the Executive Branch and the United States
negotiating team did not reach an agreement that was harmful to the United
States.'13 The concerns of the Senate were summarized in a newspaper article
cited in the Congressional Record along with the proceedings of the
resolution. 32 This article identified three possible results of the impending
treaty negotiations. First, United States industry would face significantly
increased production costs; second, the treaty would send many jobs abroad
to countries that are not bound by reduction targets; and third, the United
States would be forced to tax energy use and United States citizens would face
higher energy bills. 33 These concerns were not effectively refuted by the
administration, and the Senate passed the Byrd-Hagel Resolution by a vote of95-0. 134
There are several arguments that explain the rationale behind the Byrd-
Hagel Resolution. First, some argue that it would not be effective for only
Annex I countries to be obligated to reduce emissions if developing countries
are allowed to continue increasing their emissions of greenhouse gases at a
rapid rate. The rate of greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries is
expected to exceed that of developed nations in the next fifteen to twenty
years. If this happens as predicted, any reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions by developed countries would be overshadowed by increases in
developing countries. Also, as one senator expressed, it is more logical for
developing nations to pursue economic development in an environmentally
friendly manner now than to take corrective action later.' 35
The results of the conference at Kyoto did not bind the developing nations
to reduction targets, and the protocol thus does not meet the requirements of
the Byrd-Hagel resolution. Senator Byrd, a sponsor of the resolution that
30 See 143 CONG. REC. S8113 (daily ed. July 25, 1997).
.. See id. at S8113-38 (providing transcript of the debate).
132 See id.; Jack Kemp, A Treaty Built on Hot Air, WALL ST. J., July 25, 1997, at A14.
133 See Kemp, supra note 132, at A14.
134 See 143 CONG. REC. S8138 (daily ed. July 25, 1997).
131 See 144 CONG. REC. S194, S195 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1998) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
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prevents the protocol from being ratified by the United States, believes that the
global problem of climate change cannot be solved without a global solution
that includes all nations. 36 He does, however, imply that a solution that
required gradually implemented limitations according to each developing
nations' national circumstances would be acceptable.
The Clinton Administration believes that the Clean Development
Mechanism functions as a down payment by developing nations toward more
meaningful participation in the future.'37 The Senate does not seem to agree,
and many believe that without legally binding targets the developing nations
will take advantage of the opportunity to grow without the limits of the Kyoto
Protocol. The administration is still seeking more significant commitments
from developing nations, and it is not likely to have the support of the Senate
until developing nations commit to meaningful participation.
Congressional leaders are also concerned that the Kyoto Protocol does not
meet the second requirement of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution. The impact of the
agreement on the United States economy is unclear, and various assertions
have been made regarding the costs of implementing the protocol. The
Clinton Administration reported to Congress that the United States would have
an actual reduction target of 3 percent below 1990 levels. 31 This approxima-
tion makes compliance with the protocol seem less costly than the 7 percent
reductions called for in the protocol; however, the costs of United States
compliance with the Kyoto Protocol are dependent on the methods of
compliance. If the United States is able to meet its reduction targets primarily
through an emissions trading system, compliance will be less costly than if the
United States is required to adopt more efficient energy practices or reduce
fossil fuel consumption.
The White House has estimated the costs of compliance to be much lower
than the estimates of other economists because the administration's calcula-
tions relied heavily on emissions trading. This may not be an option though
if other countries are able to successfully limit the ability of a party to achieve
its reductions primarily through emissions trading.
36 See id. at S 195. Senator Byrd expressed the concern that without the responsible action
of developing nations, the solution would not be global and would not be successful. See id.
' See Administration Economic Analysis, supra note 124, at iii.
138 See 144 CONG. REC. S 197. Although the Kyoto Protocol calls for the United States to
reduce emissions by 7 percent below 1990 levels for three greenhouse gases, emissions levels
from 19 9 5 may be used to calculate the required reductions for the other three gases. According
to the Clinton Administration, when the 1995 levels are factored into consideration, along with
the treaty's expanded definition of carbon sinks, the target reduction for the United States is
approximately 3 percent below 1990 levels. See id.
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In June 1998, the Parties to the Conference met in Bonn, Germany, to
negotiate details of the Kyoto Protocol in preparation for the fourth Confer-
ence of the Parties. In Bonn, the European Community sent a message that the
United States could not simply buy its way out of commitments but would
need to take action at home." 9 The details of the Kyoto Protocol's emissions
trading program remain to be defined, but the costs of compliance will be
greater if emissions trading is limited. Unless these details are clarified and
it is shown that emissions reductions can be achieved without harming the
economy, Senate opposition to the treaty is likely to continue.
The Clinton Administration estimated that the costs for .the United States
to meet its commitments under the protocol*
are likely to be modest if those reductions are undertaken in
an efficient manner employing the flexibility measures of
emissions trading (both domestic and international), joint
implementation, and the Clean Development Mechanism.
This would be so even without considering the direct benefits
of mitigating climate change or the impact that key additional
factors-such as the President's domestic climate change
proposals, the ancillary benefits of improved air quality, or
the inclusion of sinks-could have on lowering the net costs
of mitigation."4
Using computer models, the administration's economists estimated that the
costs of attaining the emissions targets might amount to between seven and
twelve billion dollars per year in 2008-2012.'4' This estimate represents only
0.1 percent of the projected Gross Domestic Product."' The administration
emphasizes the point that these costs may be reduced by the benefits of
139 See 144 CONG. REC. S7164, S7165 (daily ed. June 25, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Murkowski).
0 Administration Economic Analysis, supra note 124, at iii.
141 See id. at iv.
142 See id. "The same model predicts that emission permits in 2010 would cost between $14
and $23 per ton of carbon equivalent-which would translate into an increase of about 4 to 60
per gallon of gasoline. The increase in energy prices would raise the average household's
energy bill in 2010 by between $70 and $110 per year-a relatively small amount compared to
typical energy price changes. Moreover, this increase would be substantially offset by the
decline in electricity prices resulting from the Administration's electricity restructuring
proposal." Id.
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mitigating climate, change and the potential for employment of other cost-
effective policy measures in addition to emissions trading. 4a
Currently, it is doubtful the Senate will be convinced that compliance can
be achieved without harming the economy. In adopting a resolution that
encourages President Clinton not to sign the Kyoto Protocol and states that the
Senate will reject any proposed protocol inconsistent with the Byrd-Hagel
resolution, the Senate cited economic impact studies by the federal govern-
ment. These studies found that commitments requiring the United States to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels "would result in the loss of
more than 900,000 jobs in the United States, sharply increase energy prices,
reduce family incomes and wages and cause severe losses of output in energy
intensive industries such as aluminum, steel, rubber, chemicals, and
utilities. . . ."'" A senior vice-president from the Wharton Econometrics
Forecasting Associates testified before a Senate committee that the Clinton
Administration's economic analysis of the Kyoto protocol's impact on the
United States economy was flawed. She predicted that the costs of meeting
the protocol's requirements would be $250 billion, which represents a loss of
3.2 percent of gross domestic product.145 She also stated that the protocol
would cost the United States 2.5 million jobs and that the annual expense per
family would exceed $2,700.'" These estimates vary widely from those of the
Clinton Administration, but none of the estimates should be relied on until the
means of implementation and compliance are certain.
There is further opposition to the Kyoto Protocol from the fossil fuel
industry. A coalition of oil companies was recently formed with the goal of
waging a multi-million dollar campaign that would publicize the dissenting
science and question the repercussions of the agreement on the United States
economy. ANew York Times article discussed an internal memo of this group
that expressed concern over the possibility of a "deep reduction in American
consumption of fossil fuels.' 47 The document called for spending five million
dollars over two years in order to" 'maximize the impact of scientific views
consistent with ours on Congress, the media, and other key audiences.' "i
143 See id.
'44 144 CONG. REc. S6880, 56882 (daily ed. June 23, 1998).
145 See 144 CONG. REC. S3240, S3244 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1998) (statement of Sen. Craig).
146 See id.
147 144 CONG. REC. H2323, H2325 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1998) (statement of Rep. Miller,
quoting John H:Cushman, Jr., Industrial Group Plans to Battle Climate Treaty, N.Y. TIMES,




In response to this group, Representative Miller argued that a recent poll
revealed that 77 percent of Americans believe that global warming is occurring
and that 67 percent believe steps should be taken to combat global warming. '49
In trying to persuade congressional leaders not to succumb to the public
relations campaign of the oil companies, Miller said:
So we see the tobacco companies, they set up their spin
organizations; the health care corporations, they set up their
spin organizations; and now the oil companies are going to set
up their spin organizations to tell us that all of this we have
heard about climate change, greenhouse gases, global warm-
ing is nothing for us to be concerned about. Well, the fact is
it is something for us to be very concerned about."0
It is not in the best interest of the oil companies for the United States to stop
burning fossil fuels, and the companies claim compliance with the protocol
would be very costly. Representative Miller disagreed, stating:
The truth is the steps necessary to curb global warming
present an enormous economic opportunity for the people of
the United States. The scientific evidence about global
warming compels strong action, not a head-in-the-sand
approach that characterizes the organized opposition to the
Kyoto Protocol and U.S. energy efficiency measures. 5'
Many countries and industries have adopted energy efficient practices as a
method of cost-efficiency. If the United States wishes to remain an economic
and technological leader, Miller argues, it is necessary to recognize the
opportunities in global climate change mitigation. 52 The current global
market for energy efficient products and services is $80 billion per year and
is expected to increase to $125 billion per year by 2015.153 Miller also claims
that several studies estimate the job growth potential "from energy efficiency
and technological innovation will exceed 800,000 new jobs over the next 15
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years."' 54 The opposition of the oil companies is very strong, and they are
correct in asserting that the evidence on global warming is incomplete.
Members of Congress, however, need to carefully consider the underlying
reasons for the opposition of the fossil fuel industry. In evaluating such
opposition, the long-term costs and benefits should be weighed before
adopting a long-term solution.
C. The Role of Developing Nations
Negotiations to strengthen the FCCC may fail because many of the
industrialized countries argue that they should not commit to greenhouse gas
reduction targets unless developing countries also agree to reductions.
Unfortunately,
[t]his position backtracks on the pivotal compromise reached
in the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC),
which balanced the timing and strength of actions by industri-
alized countries (which are largely responsible for the climate
change that is now underway) with those of developing
countries (which ultimately will be the major source of
emissions).'
This position rests on a faulty assumption that because developing countries
are not legally bound by the same commitments agreed to by the developed
nations, the developing countries are not and will not take action to mitigate
climate change. On the contrary, developing nations are already taking action
to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions even without binding reduction
commitments." 6
Under the FCCC, developed nations "accepted a greater burden ... for
slowing the growth of greenhouse gas emissions" because of the fact that
industrialized nations presently account for more than two-thirds of annual
carbon dioxide emissions and an even larger share of other greenhouse
gases. 7 There were many other reasons for the FCCC's policy of differentia-
tion of commitments between developed and developing nations, including:
(1) equity considerations due to the fact that the bulk of past greenhouse gas
15 Id.





emissions came from industrialized nations; (2) the cumulative releases of
developing countries will not match those of developed nations for a long
time; and (3) growth in emissions in developing countries results from meeting
the basic needs of growing populations whereas the growth of emissions in
developed countries contributes to already high standards of living. 5 "
Moreover, "developing countries are already doing a great deal to limit
emissions-a fact largely overlooked in the current debate."'5 9 Despite the
equity concerns that allowed the developing nations to avoid legally binding
commitments for now, "by 2020, developing country emissions are projected
to exceed those of industrialized countries. To prevent dangerous impacts
from climate change, developing countries will eventually need to reduce the
rate of growth and, ultimately, the level of their emissions. ' '16
There are several examples of climate change mitigation activities that have
already been implemented in developing nations:
1. Price Reform.
Between 1990-1991 and 1995-1996, total fossil fuel subsidies
in 14 developing countries, accounting for 25% of global
carbon emissions from industrial sources, declined by 45%,
from $60 billion to about $33 billion (World Bank, 1997).
(During this same period, OECD subsidies declined by 21%,
from $12 billion to $9.9 billion). Reduced subsidies lead to




2. Promotion of energy efficiency and renewable energy. These activities,
which decrease emissions through decreased reliance on fossil fuels, are being
promoted in many developing countries. China, Mexico, India, and Brazil
have all adopted specific programs to encourage the use of both renewable
energy and energy efficient products.'62 Renewable energy, including
hydropower and biomass, now accounts for 25 percent of energy use in China,
and in some rural areas the reliance on renewable power approaches 50
... See id. at 234-35.
159 Id. at 235.
'60 Id. at 233.
161 Id. at 235.
162 See id.
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percent.'63 In India, wind generation capability increased from 39 megawatts
to 820 megawatts between 1992 and 1996." The government of India
encourages the use of renewable forms of energy through tax incentives. 65 In
Mexico, voluntary programs have been launched between government and
industry to encourage energy conservation."i6 The Brazilian government has
been able to reduce its automobile fossil fuel consumption by one-half through
an aggressive program to use ethanol from sugar cane to fuel automobiles.167
Ethanol is a renewable resource, and this program has reduced Brazil's total
emissions from fossil fuels by 15 percent. 6
The greenhouse gas reduction programs implemented by developing
countries were not adopted as a result of domestic climate mitigation
projects. 69 Emission reductions have been "a side benefit of policy changes
and projects designed to meet national economic, social, and public health
needs. '"7° These projects were initiated in response to energy shortages and
public health problems due to air pollution. ' Side benefits also are encourag-
ing developed nations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Only two Annex
I countries, the United Kingdom and Germany, are likely to meet the FCCC's
goal of returning to 1990 emissions levels by the year 2000; this is largely due
to factors not related to the mitigation of climate change.7 Two-thirds of the
emissions reductions expected by 2000 in the United Kingdom will result from
the replacement of coal-fired plants with more energy efficient fuel methods.
Germany's reductions will result primarily from the switch from coal to
natural gas following unification with the former East Germany." 3
Many industrialized parties were disappointed by the protocol's failure to
include new commitments for developing parties. The voluntary commit-
ments, which encourage all parties to promote sustainable development by
mitigating climate change, are not strong enough to allay the fears of
developed nations like the United States. Opponents of the protocol have
3 See Fourth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention
on Climate Change, Press Kit, BuenosAires 1998 (visited Mar. 12,2000) <http://www.unep.ch/
iuc/submenu/press/climate/cop4kit.htn> [hereinafter Buenos Aires 1998].
164 See id.
165 See Reid & Goldemberg, supra note 61, at 235.
'6 See id.
167 See id.
'" See id. at 236.
16 See id.






expressed several fears. These include the fear that developing nations will
have no incentive to comply with the voluntary commitments and the fear that
many industries will relocate to developing nations rather than comply with
the reduction requirements of the developed nations. 174 Advocates of the
protocol point to the activities mentioned above that demonstrate the
developing world's commitment to climate change mitigation.7 5 To achieve
a compromise acceptable to all parties, the parties should accept legally
binding commitments that recognize differentiated levels of responsibility.
D. Subsequent Negotiations of the Conference of the Parties
Officials representing 180 governments met in Buenos Aires from
November 2-13, 1998, to negotiate the details for reaching the reduction
targets of the Kyoto Protocol. 76  The convention's Executive Secretary
Michael Zammit Cutajar noted that defining the details of the protocol's three
primary mechanisms was important because it would affect the economic costs
of emission reductions and the role of both developed and developing nations
in meeting future commitments. 7 7 Implementation of the mechanisms has
been controversial because of the concern that some nations will be able to
meet their targets with little effort and will then be able to sell large quantities
of emissions credits to industrialized countries. 71 Some parties believe that
placing limits on the amount of credits countries are allowed to buy and sell
will ensure that no country is able to buy its way out of the commitments and
that each country is forced to make domestic cuts in emissions. 7 9
The negotiations at Buenos Aires did not result in specific rules for
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, but the parties were able to agree on a
two-year Plan of Action.8 0 The Plan of Action accelerates the goals of the
FCCC and establishes a work schedule for the parties to finalize the remaining
details of the protocol. The parties' goal is for the plan to make the Kyoto
Protocol fully operational by 2001."' The parties intensely debated mecha-
nisms of implementation, and the resulting plan addresses several issues that
must be considered to ensure that the mechanisms are effective. These issues
' See generally id. at 234 (discussing industry and political concerns about the protocol).
175 See id.
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include: "the nature and scope of the mechanisms, criteria for project
eligibility, compatibility with sustainable development, auditing and
verification criteria, institutional roles, principles and guidelines, and so
forth."18
2
The issue of future commitments of developing countries was not formally
on the agenda at COP-4, but the host government of Argentina requested that
the topic of voluntary commitments be discussed. President Menem of
Argentina addressed the participants and expressed his country's intention to
voluntarily adopt a limitation target for the 2008 to 2012 period. 3 The
country of Kazakhstan also expressed its intention to join the Annex I
countries and accept a legally binding target. Voluntary commitments from
these developing nations could encourage other developing nations to follow
their example. Voluntary commitments may also reassure industrialized
nations that they will not bear sole responsibility for mitigating climate
change.
The Kyoto Protocol received the signature of the United States during the
Buenos Aires conference on November 12, 1998. While the world was
watching, the United States became the sixtieth country to sign the protocol.
Although the protocol has been signed by more than the required minimum
number of nations, it has not been ratified by the required percentage of
nations. In addition to the United States, there are many countries that have
signed but not ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The United States signing of the
Kyoto Protocol is important internationally because the world looks to the
United States for leadership, and many countries would not take action without
some indication that the United States would also be committed to the Kyoto
agreement. However, it will be difficult to obtain ratification in the United
States due to the Byrd-Hagel Resolution.
The fifth Conference of the Parties was held in Bonn, Germany, between
October 25 and November 5, 1999. The goal of this meeting was to define
rules for the three implementation mechanisms and establish consequences for
failure to meet the emissions targets of the protocol. 5 The delegates finished
their work earlier than expected, and the parties seemed optimistic that they
182 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Charge, Press Release: Climate




185 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Press Release: Talks to
Build Global Consensus for Post-2000 Action on Climate Change (visited Apr. 10, 2000)
<http://cop5.unfccc.de/media/cop5kit.html> [hereinafter Global Consensus].
586 [Vol. 28:555
GLOBAL WARMING
are on target to fulfill the goals of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action by the
conclusion of the sixth Conference of the Parties.1
8 6
E. National and International Alternatives to the Kyoto Protocol
The Clinton Administration and United States industries have implemented
many programs that will help reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases and
mitigate climate change. Many of these programs were not implemented as
a response to the threat of global warming but were chosen instead for
economic reasons. Research and development programs aimed at increased
energy efficiency have led to cost savings for industries and consumers in
addition to yielding reduced emissions. Without a binding international
agreement, governments and industries may pursue climate mitigating
programs for various reasons, but the question is whether these efforts alone
will be enough to decrease the risks of climate change. Opponents of the
Kyoto Protocol argue that the individual efforts of nations and industries will
be the most cost-efficient approach. However, the overwhelming balance of
evidence indicates that an organized global response is necessary to seriously
address the risks of global climate change. Although the costs of compliance
with the Kyoto Protocol may be higher in the short-term, the long-term
outlook favors an immediate international response. Following the precaution-
ary principle of international law gives the countries of the world a unique
opportunity to come together and take careful action to benefit all mankind.
Regardless of the atmospheric changes, the global climate of politics and
communications is changing, and an international law that reflects these
changes seems the best approach to solving global problems such as climate
change.
A realistic alternative to the Kyoto Protocol has not been proposed. The
choice is either to ignore the risks or to acknowledge the efforts of years of
scientific study and political negotiations. Countries should accept the
protocol as a work in progress. It is part of the FCCC, and it will continue to
evolve as the COP continues to meet and evaluate the global climate situation.
As the parties further negotiate, it is possible that the protocol may be revised
into a document that is acceptable to a majority of the conference parties.
1" See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Press Release: Ministers
Pledge to Finalize Climate Agreement by November 2000 (visited Apr. 10, 2000) <http://cop5.
unfccc.de/media/cop5pressf.html>. At the time of COP-5, the Kyoto Protocol had been signed
by 84 parties including the European Community. The protocol has been ratified by 14 parties,
all of which represent developing nations. COP-6 will be held at The Hague, Netherlands, from
November 13-24, 2000. See Global Consensus, supra note 185.
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IV. CONCLUSION: THE UNITED STATES SHOULD
ADOPT THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
There are two dangers which lawmakers must avoid: the first
is paying too little attention to the possibility of global
warming; the second is treating the concern with global
warming as a fad and developing superficial responses in the
interest of political expediency rather than from a basis in
careful consideration of the impacts.
117
To avoid these dangers, Botkin describes two classes of legal options: "those
directed at eliminating the causes of global warming, and those aimed at
mitigating the effects of global warming. ' 188
The United States and the rest of the international community should take
steps to pursue both classes of legal options. The Kyoto Protocol is not a
complete solution, but it does take steps to eliminate the causes of global
warming and to mitigate the effects of the phenomenon. Although the costs
of implementing the protocol cannot be accurately calculated until the methods
of compliance are ascertained, the United States should adopt the protocol.
The Kyoto Protocol was not intended to be a final resolution to the problem of
global climate change, but merely part of a larger, evolving agreement that
began with the FCCC. Members of the United States Senate have valid
concerns about adopting a treaty that lacks enforcement mechanisms and other
important elements. However, the nations of the world will not move forward
to improve the agreement if the United States does not show a willingness to
compromise and accept responsibility for its contributions to the global
climate change problem. In the long run, the costs of the protocol are not
likely to be significant compared to the costs of ignoring the risks. Throughout
history, people have been able to efficiently adapt to changes in technology
and availability of resources. It is reasonable that the United States and the
entire world will be able to do so now.
The Kyoto Protocol is not a perfect agreement. Its weaknesses include
uncertainty in compliance, monitoring, and enforcement measures. These
weaknesses are not incurable, and they should not be significant enough for the
United States Senate to refuse to ratify the agreement. Representatives from
the United States and the rest of the world have worked long and hard to
produce an agreement that involves the efforts of all nations and recognizes a




differentiated responsibility among nations. The United States needs to
recognize its role as a world leader and accept responsibility for the contribu-
tions it has made to the increased atmospheric concentration of greenhouse
gases.
Understandably, the United States is concerned about the role of develop-
ing nations in the mitigation of climate change, but the United States should
not refuse to take action until the developing nations have agreed to legally
binding commitments. Instead, the United States should provide leadership
by example and should continue to actively promote the involvement of
developing nations in the mitigation of climate change. The protocol's
flexible mechanisms will allow the United States to reduce its greenhouse gas
emissions through cooperative international efforts. Compliance with the
protocol will result in costs and benefits, but the economic stability of the
United States will not be threatened by our compliance with the protocol.
Some scientists and environmentalists question whether the protocol is strong
enough to mitigate climate change, and they believe that anything less than
compliance may not secure our future stability.
The Kyoto Protocol is a good foundation from which to build a strong
agreement. There are several steps that should be taken to make the agreement
stronger. First, the industrialized nations must secure the commitments of
developing nations. Although fairness and equity concerns argue against
forcing developing nations to reduce emissions at the cost of economic growth,
some compromise should be reached that allows developing nations to
promote sustainable growth. This would appease the United States and other
developed nations by assuring them that their efforts would not be futile and
their industries would not relocate to developing nations. Although it is
argued that the lack of developing country participation will not have a
significant impact on United States competitiveness, it is still necessary for
developing countries to commit to emissions controls because they will
become the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions in the near future. 89
Second, the parties to the protocol need to commit to the Plan of Action
adopted in Buenos Aires. The details of emissions trading, joint implementa-
tion, and the Clean Development Mechanism will be finalized under the plan,
and this will allow parties to move forward and develop efficient programs for
'g See Reid & Goldemberg, supra note 61, at 233. Professor Robert Stavins said that four
developing countries need to accept emissions controls: China, Brazil, India, and South Korea.
If these countries do not accept emissions controls, energy intensive industries are likely to shift
to the developing world and this will increase the costs of future emissions controls in
developing countries. See Climate Change: Kyoto Protocol Flawed but Fixable, Harvard
University Professor Tells Briefing, 21 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 202 (Mar. 4, 1998).
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reaching their targets. The parties also need to finalize the procedures for
handling noncompliance. The procedures should be strong enough to
discourage noncompliance yet flexible enough to encourage parties that the
protocol is a reasonable agreement.
The Kyoto Protocol is the product of a remarkable international effort. It
calls for sacrifices and compromises from all the parties involved. The United
States may not be completely satisfied with the agreement at this time, but the
costs of mitigating climate change are certain to be less today than they will
be in the future, and the United States is not the only nation being called to
make important decisions and tough sacrifices. In the words of Representative
Hamilton,
Finally, the Kyoto Protocol is historic and important-but it
is only a first step. In the United States, the debate over
global warming has really just begun. This must be seen as
an initial and partial agreement, which will begin many years
of international negotiations. With sustained and committed
leadership, this treaty can evolve into a significant interna-
tional agreement that commits the nations of the world to
action to safeguard the future of the planet. Reducing
emissions will protect against unpleasant environmental
surprises. The pressing question is how much should we
sacrifice now to buy insurance against unknown future
threats. To do nothing would be irresponsible, but to sacrifice
our economic vitality would be a high price to pay, and the
benefits are uncertain.... There is no reason to rush or panic,
but gradual steps now to reduce reliance on fossil fuels could
prevent disruptive climate change later-change that could
severely damage the economies of the world. If we do not get
this right, our grandchildren will not-and should not-for-
give us. "°
' 144 CONG. REC. E67, E68 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1998) (statement of Rep. Hamilton).
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APPENDIX A: ANNEX I TO THE FCCC'9'
The industrialized countries listed in this annex to the convention are trying
to return their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 as per
article 4.2(a) and (b). They also have accepted emission targets for the period
2008-12 as per article 3 and annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. They include the
following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia,
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, the European Community, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Ukraine, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of
America.
APPENDIX B: ANNEX B TO THE KYOTO PROTOCOL192
This annex lists the negotiated emissions targets for the Annex I countries.
PARTY QUANTIFIED EMISSION LIMITATION OR REDUCTION COMMITMENT
















'9' FCCC, supra note 41, Annex I.
'2 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 67, Annex B.
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United Kingdom of Great Britain 92
and Northern Ireland
United States of America 93
The economies in transition include Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and
the Ukraine. Under article three of the Kyoto Protocol, these parties may be
able to use a base year other than 1990 or 1995.
APPENDIX C: ANNEX II TO THE FCCC 193
The rich countries listed in this annex to the convention have a special
obligation to help developing countries with financial and technological
resources. They include the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, the European Economic Community, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
'93 FCCC, supra note 4 1, Annex II.
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New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States
of America.

